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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises from Summary Judgment Motion partially granted in a 
Memorandum Opinion issued by the Magistrate Court on October 8, 2015. R.pp.198-
205. The Magistrate ruled that Heinz All's Creditor's Claim against the jointly probated 
estates of Robert Melton and Hedwig Melton was barred as against Hedwig Melton's 
Estate pursuant to Idaho Code§ 15-3-803(a)(l). Heinz Alt also challenged the timeliness 
of the Estates' disallowance of his Creditor's Claim. The Magistrate Court ruled that the 
disallowance of the Creditor's Claim by the Estate was timely. These two (2) issues were 
appealed to the District Court. 
On appeal to the District Court, Judge Stegner, reversed the Magistrate decision 
granting the Estate's Summary Judgment as to Heinz Alt's Creditor's Claim against 
Hedwig Melton's Estate and affirmed the Magistrate with regard to the ruling on the 
timely disallowance of Mr. All's Creditor's Claim. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This case commenced with the filing of a Petition for Summary Administration of 
Estate of Robert Melton ("Robert") on August 29, 2013, by Robert's wife of just three 
years, Jadwiga Melton ("Jadwiga"). R. pp. l 0-18. Robert married Jadwiga in 2010 after his 
first wife, Hedwig Melton's ("Hedy") death in 2008. R. pp. 10-18. 
The Will submitted for probate by Jadwiga was not properly executed or self-
authenticating. R. pp. 12-17. All assets of the estate were community property of Robert 
and Hedy acquired during the marriage. The Trial Court entered a decree vesting the estate 
in Jadwiga on August 30, 2013. R. pp. 19-20. 
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Heinz Alt ("Heinz") is the son of Hedy and step son of Robert, raised by Robert 
from a young age. Heinz filed a Motion to Convert Proceedings to Supervised 
Administration and to Determine Testacy on September 6, 2013. R. pp. 21-38. Following a 
hearing on October 15th, the Court set aside the Decree Vesting Estate in Surviving Spouse. 
R. pp. 3 9-40. 
On December 9, 2014, Jadwiga, through new counsel, filed a Joint Petition for the 
probate of Robert Ernest Melton and Hedwig "Hedy" Melton's Estates. R. pp. 41-44. 
On January 13, 2015, Heinz filed his claim against the Estate for the sum of 
$102,574.50. The verified claim sets forth a series of loans made to Robert and Hedy 
Melton during their lifetime by Heinz for the purpose of acquiring the land and building a 
home in Boundary County, Idaho, which is the primary asset identified in this Estate. R. pp. 
45-54. 
Following a contested hearing regarding authenticity of the 2010 Will submitted by 
Jadwiga, the Court entered an Order for Formal Probate of Will and Formal Appointment of 
Personal Representative on February 2, 2015. R. pp. 55-57. 
On May 4, 2015, Heinz filed a Petition to allow his claim. R. pp. 59-68. 
On June 29, 2015, the Estate filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on Heinz's 
Creditor's Claim asserting a variety of issues. R. pp. 69-91. 
On October 8, 2015, the Magistrate issued its Memorandum Opinion denying the 
Estates' Motion for Summary Judgment on all issues except Heinz's Creditor's Claim 
against the Estate of Hedwig "Hedy" Melton. As part of these issues, the Court also ruled 
on the timeliness of the Estates' disallowance of the Creditor's Clain1 that the claim was 
timely disallowed under the Idaho Probate Code. R. pp. 198-205. 
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On December 3, 2015, the Magistrate entered a Judgment in accordance with the 
Memorandum Opinion certifying the same under Rule 54(b). R. pp. 206-207. 
Heinz filed a timely Notice of Appeal on January 13, 2016. R. pp. 208-210. 
Heinz filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on March 2, 2016. R. pp. 216-218. 
Following briefing and oral argument, the District Court, acting in its appellate 
capacity issued an Opinion on Appeal on November 30, 2016. R. pp. 317-334. 
The District Court affirmed the Magistrate's Decision with regard to the Estates' 
timely disallowance of the Creditor's Claim, but reversed the Magistrate's ruling that 
Heinz's Creditor's Claim was barred under Idaho Code § 15-3-803 as against Hedy 
Melton's Estate. R. pp. 317-334. 
On January 10, 2017, Jadwiga filed a Notice of Appeal of the District Court's 
decision. R. pp. 363-366. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts here are largely undisputed and are contained within the verified 
Creditor's Claim filed by Heinz. Heinz is the biological son of Hedy and stepson of 
Robert and was raised by Robert from a young age. Heinz loaned money to Hedy and 
Robert for the purpose of enabling them to purchase land and build a log home on that 
land in Boundary County, Idaho. The land and log home are the only substantial assets of 
the Estates at the time of Hedy's and Robert's respective deaths. R. pp. 61-68. 
The property was previously deeded to Heinz in recognition of the loan received 
by Robert and Hedy. These Gift Deeds were attached and submitted in supported of the 
Sununary Judgment and other proceedings by Affidavit of Mary Cusack. R. pp. 71-75. 
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Subsequently, Robert and Hedy executed Wills leaving all of their estates to 
Heinz following which Heinz deeded the Bonners Ferry property back to Hedy and 
Robert. R. pp. 25-32; 369. 
Hedy died August 11, 2008. No probate was filed. Less than two (2) years later, 
Robert married Jadwiga, a woman significantly younger than Robert. Hedy and Robert's 
1998 Wills left all assets (all of which were community) to the surviving spouse and then 
to Heinz in the event of both deaths. R. pp. 25-32. The 1998 Wills were submitted for 
probate after Robert's death by Heinz in a Motion to Convert Proceedings to a Summary 
Administration. R. pp. 21-32. 
On Robert's death, Jadwiga submitted a December 17, 2010, Will purportedly 
executed by Robert just a few months after marrying Jadwiga. However, all of the assets 
at the time of Robert's death were held as community property of Robert and Hedy. As 
such, the Summary Administration procedure was improper and the Court entered an 
Order setting aside the Decree Vesting the Estate to Surviving Spouse. 
Following a contested hearing brought by Jadwiga to prove the proper execution 
ofRobert's 2010 Will, Jadwiga was appointed as Personal Representative of the Estate in 
a formal appointment proceeding of the joint estates of Robert and Hedy. 
Thereafter, Jadwiga filed Summary Judgment on numerous issues, most of which 
were denied. The Magistrate took under advisement the issue of whether Heinz's 
Creditor's Claim was barred by the three (3) year limitations found in Idaho Code § 15-3-
803 as against Hedy's Estate. In a Memorandum Opinion, Judge Julian held that§ LC. § 
15-3-803 barred the Creditor's Claim as against Hedy in the joint probate proceedings of 
Robert and Hedy's Estates, but that "Heinz may still proceed with his claim against 
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Robert's Estate". R. pp. 198-205. The Magistrate issued a Judgment on December 3, 
2015. R. pp. 206-207. 
This appeal followed and tbe District Court reversed the Magistrate Judge in an 
18-page Opinion on Appeal. R. pp. 368-385. 
Jadwiga filed a Notice of appeal from the District Court's decision reversing the 
Magistrate. 
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II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. The District Court correctly construed the statutory language of LC. § 15-
3-111 and LC.§ 15-3-803. 
B. Contrary to Appellant's Brief, the District Court did not err in its 
consideration of legislative intent when construing Idaho Code § 15-3-111. 
C. The District Court properly applied rules of statutory construction when 
construing LC.§ 15-3-111 and LC.§ 15-3-803. 
D. Jadwiga is not entitled to her costs and attorney's fees. 
E. Respondent is entitled to his attorney's fees and costs. 
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In cases in which the Appellate Court is reviewing the decision of the District 
Court sitting in its appellate capacity on a decision by the Magistrate's Court, the standard 
of review is as follows: 
The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) 
record to determine whether there is substantial and 
competent evidence to support the magistrate's finding of 
fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow 
from those findings. If those findings are so supported and 
the conclusions follow therefrom, and if the district court 
affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affmn the district 
court's decision as a matter of procedure. 
Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 
859,303 P.3d214, 218 (2013) 
However, as in this case where the District Court has reversed the Magistrate's 
Decision, the same standard has been applied in cases in which the District Court has 
reversed the Magistrate Court. 
When reviewing the decision of the district court sitting in 
its appellate capacity, our standard of review is the same as 
expressed by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) 
record to determine whether there is substantial and 
competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of 
fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow 
from those findings. If those fmdings are so supported, and 
the conclusions follow therefrom, and if the district court 
affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affmn the district 
court's decision as a matter of procedure. 
State v. Colvin, 157 Idaho 881, 
882, 341 P.3d 598, 599 (App.2014); 
quoting Pelayo v. Pelayo, supra. 
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"Thus, we do not review the magistrate court's decisions. Rather, we are 
'procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of the district court"'. Bailey v. 
Bailey. 153 Idaho 526,529,284 P.3d 970,973 (2012); quoting State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 
413, 415n.1, 224P.3d480, 482n.1 (2009). 
"This [C]ourt exercises free review over the lower court's conclusions oflaw .... 
This Court also "exercises free review when interpreting the meaning of a statute". Doe 
v. Doe, 162 Idaho 254, __ , 395 P.3d 1287, 1289 (2017) 
The District Court properly applied the Uniform Probate Code provisions in 
reversing the Magistrate. This Court is asked to affirm the District Court's decision. 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court correctly construed the statntory language of I.C. § 
15-3-111 and LC. § 15-3-803. 
Appellant's Brief argues that the District Court sitting in its appellate capacity 
failed to analyze and apply the plain meaning of the statutory provisions ofldaho Code § 
15-3-111 and Idaho Code§ 15-3-803 and that this failure was error as a matter oflaw 
requiring reversal. 
Appellant's Brief further argues that the language of the statute is "precise and 
should be construed by its literal words". Appellant's Brief, p.13. 
Appellant also argues that Idaho Code § 15-3-803 is unambiguous and clear in its 
language and makes no reference to Idaho Code § 15-3-111 and, therefore, the extensions 
of time for filing of probates found in subsection 111 should be disregarded and 
subsection 803 read in isolation or without reference to the remaining portions of the 
Probate Code. 
Appellant's position is that the unambiguous language of LC. § 15-3-803 should 
be read to prohibit all creditor's claims beyond the three (3) year of decedent's date of 
death. Appellants' position requires application of section 803 while ignoring the 
specific exceptions of section 111 that allow for filing a joint probate of husband and wife 
where the assets are community property, but more than three (3) years have elapsed from 
the date of death of the first spouse to die. 
Appellant's legal authority for this premise is the case of Bonner County v. 
Cunninghfill1, 156 Idaho 291,323, PJd 1252 (App., 2014). This case arises from a 
search warrant and seizure of cash followed by a civil forfeiture action which was 
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untimely filed. The sole issue arising in Bonner County v. Cunningham was 
Cunningham's entitled to an award of attorney's fees. 
Appellant is correct that the Appellate Courts have consistently required that the 
interpretation of a statute "begins with its literal word" and that "[t]hose words must be 
given their plain, obvious and rational meaning". Bonner County v. Cunningham, 156 
Idaho 291, 295, 323 P.3d 1252, 1256 (App., 2014). 
The decision in Bonner County v. Cunningham cites to Verska v. St. Alphonsus 
Regional Medical Center, a 2011 case in which the Idaho Supreme Court notes: "The 
interpretation of a statute 'must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words 
must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed 
as a whole'". Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889,893, 
265 P.3d 502,506 (20ll) [emphasis added]; quoting In re Estate of Miller, 143 Idaho 
565,567, 149 P.3d 840,842 (2006); also quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360,362, 
79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). 
Appellant asserts that the District Court's opinion did not make a finding that the 
statute was ambiguous when it chose to construe the statute using additional rules of 
statutory construction and did not engage in its own analysis of the plain language of the 
statute, the legislative history. Appellant's Brief, p.13 
Both assertions are incorrect and misrepresent the District Court's opinion. The 
latter assertion also misstates the law in Idaho as stated in Verska. The District Court is 
not required to or should it analyze legislative history when an analysis of the plain 
language of the statute, as a whole, leads to clear and unambiguous application of the law. 
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The District Court, beginning at page 13 of its Opinion on Appeal, went through 
extensive analysis of the statutory provisions contained within the Idaho Probate Code, as 
follows: 
The three year limitation for creditors in LC. § 15-3-
803( a)(l) parallels the general time limit for probating an 
estate. LC.§ 15-3-108 states: "No formal probate or 
appointment proceeding, or formal testacy or appointment 
proceeding, .... may be commenced more than three years 
after the decedent's death." 
Although the general rule requires a probate action to be 
commenced within three years of an individual's death, 
there are two exceptions to the rule. First, pursuant to LC. 
§ 15-3-1205, upon the death of a person leaving a surviving 
spouse as a sole devisee or beneficiary, the surviving 
spouse .... may file a petition for decree vesting the 
property in the surviving spouse .... with the condition that 
the surviving spouse ( or person claiming entitlement 
through the surviving spouse) assume and be liable for any 
and all indebtedness that might be claimed against the 
estate of the decedent. 
Second, pursuant to LC. § 15-3-111, a joint probate may be 
commenced to administer the estates of two deceased 
spouses .... " 
R. pp. 329-330 
The District Court, in fact, spends three (3) pages analyzing the interplay between 
subsection 803, 1205, 108 and 111, as well as discussing the history of the revisions or 
additions to the Probate Code. 
Additionally, the District Court addresses and discusses the legislative purpose set 
forth in the 1995 amendment to subsection 111 before coming to the District Court's final 
conclusion interpreting the probate code, as. follows: 
A basic tenet of statutory construction is that the more 
specific statute or section addressing an issue controls over 
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the statute that is more general. . . . . It is undisputed that 
LC. § 15-3-111 extends the general three year time frame in 
which to file a probate action. Consequently, in cases such 
as this one, LC. § 15-3-111 is the specific statute, while LC. 
§ 15-3-108 and LC.§ 15-3-803(a)(l) are general statutes. 
Because the three year provision of LC. § 15-3-108 only 
applies to the death of the spouse whose death occuned 
last, it would follow that the three year time frame set out in 
LC. § 15-3-803(a)(l) would also only apply to the death of 
a spouse whose death occurred last in°probate actions filed 
pursuant to LC.§ 15-3-111. 
Additionally, interpreting LC.§ 15-3-803(a)(l) as barring 
creditors' claims against the "estate of the spouse whose 
death occurred first" in probate actions commenced 
pursuant to LC.§ 15-3-111 simply because the death 
occurred more than three years prior to the commencement 
of the probate action would produce an absurd result. This 
is because LC.§ 15-3-111 expressly allows "the estates of 
both decedents [to] be joined for probate in a single 
proceeding" within three years of the "death of the spouse 
whose death occurred last". If the statute oflimitations for 
the first to die is not tolled, then in effect the only estate to 
probate is that of the second to die. "Constructions of a 
statute that would lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh 
results are disfavored." State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680,690, 
85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004) 
R. pp. 332-333 
Despite Appellants arguments, the District Court did analyze the statute (probate 
code) as a whole , and not just subsection 803 in isolation, as Appellant asserts should 
have occurred. 
This is consistent with Idaho law. "The objective of statutory interpretation is to 
give effect to legislative intent." State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471,475, 163 P.3d 1183, 
1187 (2007). "Such intent should be derived from a reading ofthe whole act at issue." 
St. Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Brd. of Comm'rs of Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho 753, 755, 
203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009). [emphasis added] 
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The District Court's opinion on appeal should be affinned by this Court. 
B. Contrary to Appellant's Brief, the District Court did not err in its 
consideration of legislative intent when construing Idaho Code § 15-3-
111. 
Appellant asserts that the District Court erred by not applying or interpreting 
legislative intent from Idaho Code § 15-3-111 or by failing to consider the legislative 
intent. Appellant's Brief, pp. 15-18. 
First, Appellant's argument is incorrect and misstates the District Court's 
Decision. Beginning at page 15 of the Opinion on Appeal, the District Court discussed at 
length the legislative intent behind Idaho Code§ 15-3-111. R. pp. 382-384. 
Furthennore, Appellant's position is incorrect with regard to the standards for 
statutory interpretation as set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
"'The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent.' 
'Such intent should be derived from a reading of the whole act at issue."' Idaho Youth 
Ranch, Inc. v. Ada County Board of Equalization, 157 Idaho 180,184,335 P.3d 25, 29 
(2014); quoting State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007); also 
quoting St. Luke's Regional Medical Center v. Ada County, 146 Idaho 753, 755, 203 
P.3d 683, 685 (2009). 
As both the District Court Opinion and the Appellant's Brief aclmowledge, the 
Court is required to interpret Idaho Code § 15-3-111 and§ 15-3-803(a)(l) as part of the 
whole act at issue, the Idaho Unifonn Probate Code adopted in 1971. LC.§ 15-1-101. 
Idaho Code § 15-1-103 requires that principles oflaw and equity are intended to 
supplement the provisions of the Probate Code unless specifically "displaced" by 
provisions of the Probate Code. LC.§ 15-1-103. 
13 
Appellant argues that subsection 111 was adopted in 1973 to "fill certain gaps left 
out of the original Probate Code" and to allow estates of two (2) deceased spouses to be 
joined for probate in a single proceeding even when the death of the first spouse is more 
than three (3) years prior to the filing and would normally be prohibited under Idaho Code 
§ 15-3-108. Appellant's Brief, pp. 16-17. 
Appellant argues that since no express reference is made to Idaho Code§ 15-3-
803, the legislative intent in adopting LC. § 15-3-111 does not include an intent to expand 
time for creditor's claims beyond three (3) years from the date of death, even though that 
subsection permits the filing of a joint probate more than three (3) years after the date of 
death. 
In this particular case, Hedy's death in 2008 would result in a bar to any creditor's 
claim after August 11, 2011, if interpreted as Appellant argues. This absurd result would 
require the filing of a probate of Hedy's Estate and a Creditor's Claim against that estate 
by Heinz while Robert was still living. 
Under Appellant's interpretation of subsection 111 and 803, Robert and Hedy's 
Estates (and estates like them) may be excluded from the provisions of joint probates 
underldaho Code § 15-3-111, based arbitrarily on whether the second spouse survives 
more, or less, than three (3) years after the first spouse dies. 
The District Court in its Opinion on Appeal noted the absurd result: 
Additionally, interpreting LC. § 15-3-803(a)(l) as barring 
creditors' claims against the "estate of the spouse whose 
death occurred first" in probate actions commenced 
pursuant to LC. § 15-3-111 simply because the death 
occurred more than three years prior to the commencement 
of the probate action would produce an absurd result. This 
is because LC.§ 15-3-111 expressly allows "the estates of 
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both decedents [to] be joined for probate in a single 
proceeding" within three years of the "death of the spouse 
whose death occurred last". If the statute oflimitations for 
the first to die is not tolled, then in effect the only estate to 
probate is that of the second to die. "Constructions of a 
statute that would lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh 
results are disfavored" State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 690, 
85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004) 
R. pp. 383-384 
Contrary to Appellant's argument, the District Court properly construed the 
legislative intent by analyzing and reading the whole act at issue (The Idaho Probate 
Code) and reconciling Idaho Code§ 15-3-111 with Idaho Code§ 15-3-803 and related 
provisions. 
"Statutory interpretation begins with the 'literal word to the statute, and this 
language should be given its plain, obvious and rational meaning"'. Idaho Youth Ranch, 
Inc. v. Ada County Board of Equalization, 157 Idaho 180, 184-5, 335 PJd 25, 29-30 
(2014); quoting Seward v. Pacific Hyde and Fur Depot 138 Idaho 509,511, 65 P.3 531, 
533 (2003). 
Additionally, the District Court's ruling is consistent with the Probate Code's 
purposes and rules of construction found at Idaho Code§ 15-1-102, which states that the 
Code is to be "liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and 
policies". Those stated policies and purposes include simplifying and clarifying the law 
concerning the affairs of decedents and should promote a speedy and efficient system for 
liquidating the estate of the decedent and making distribution to his successors. LC. § 15-
1-102 (2017). 
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Appellant's argument would be counter to the purposes and rules of construction 
set forth above, as it would require the filing of the probate upon the death of the first 
spouse to die every time a creditor has a claim and the second spouse survives by three 
(3) years or more. This is inconsistent with the purpose set forth above. 
Likewise, the District Court's Opinion on Appeal is consistent with Idaho Code § 
15-1-105 which provides that the Probate Code is a general act intended as a "unified 
coverage of its subject matter and no part of it shall be deemed impliedly repealed by 
subsequent legislation ifit can reasonably be avoided." I.C. § 15-1-1-5 (2017). 
The District Court's Opinion on Appeal reconciles subsection 111 with subsection 
803 so as not to nullify or void either provision in light of the other. 
As the District Court noted, it is the obligation of the Court to interpret the statute 
in a manner that would not lead to an absurd or unreasonably harsh result. 
For these reasons, the District Court's decision should be affirmed as reversing 
the Magistrate's Decision. 
C. The District Court properly applied rules of statutory construction 
when construing I.C. § 15-3-111 and I.C. § 15-3-803. 
In this section, the Appellant argues that the Court misapplied rules of 
construction. As asserted above, the Respondent believes that the Court did not, in fact, 
construe the statute, but simply applied the plain meaning of Idaho Code § 15-3-111 as an 
exception to the general statutory requirement that all probates be filed within three (3) 
years of the decedent's death. The Court then properly interpreted that Code section 
along with Idaho Code § 15-3-803 in such a manner as to reconcile both statutory 
provisions within the context of the whole Idaho Probate Code. This avoids an absurd 
16 
result. As discussed above, the District Court's analysis was proper in light of the 
directives on statutory interpretation set forth in prior case law and as set forth in the 
provisions of the Probate Code itself. 
Beginning at page 19 of her Brief, the Appellant argues that the District inserted 
additional language into subsection 111, but at no point does the Appellant state what 
additional language the District Court supposedly inserted into this subsection of the 
probate code. 
Perhaps some of the Appellant's confusion arises from her misreading ofldaho 
Code§ 15-3-803. Appellant argues that this statutory provision imposes a "statute of 
limitations" on submission of creditor's claims. In fact, subsection 803 states as follows: 
(a) All claims against a decedent's estate which arose 
before the death of the decedent, including the claims of the 
state and any subdivision thereof ( except claims for state 
taxes), .... if not barred earlier by another statute of 
limitations or non-claims statute, are barred against the 
estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and 
devisees of the decedent, unless presented within the earlier 
of the following dates: (1) three years after the decedent's 
death ... 
LC. § 15-3-803 (2017)1 
Keeping in mind the standard on summary judgments, there is a disputed fact as to 
whether or not Heinz's Creditor's Claim was a claim which arose before the deaths of 
Hedy and Robert. The verified claim indicates that Hedy and Robert were loaned money 
by Heinz, which initially secured by conveying title to the property to Heinz followed by 
execution of Wills which left the entirety of their estate to Heinz upon the second 
1 Subsection 2 of the statute is inapplicable in this case and it is not quoted here because 
of the language "the earlier of the following dates". 
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spouse's death. In other words, the record before the Court would indicate that the claim 
was not one which arose until after both Robert and Hedy had died, at which point the 
Wills executed prior to Robert's marriage to Jadwiga would have left all of their estates 
by bequest to Heinz as a means of repayment. 
Further, when looking at the committee comments to section 803, it does not 
appear, as Appellant argues, that 803 was intended as a "statute of limitations" for 
creditors, so much as a means to expedite administration of estates. 
"In 1989, the Joint Editorial Board recommended amendments to Subsection (a). 
The change in (1) shortens the ultimate limitations period on claims against a decedent 
from 3 years after death to 1 year after death. Corresponding amendments were 
recommended for Sections 3-1003(a)(l) and 3.-1006. The new one-year from death 
limitation (which applies without regard to whether or when an estate is opened for 
administration) is designed to prevent concerns stemming from the possible applicability 
to this Code of Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340, 485 U.S. 
478 (1988) from unduly prolonging estate settlements and closings. Idaho Code§ 15-3-
803. Uniform Law Comments (2017) 
Obviously, Idaho has adhered to the three (3) year limit on presentation of claims, 
but the committee comments reflect a mindset that this code section is more about timely 
administration and closing of estates, than barring creditor claims. 
Regardless of the technical aspects of the summary judgment and whether a 
disputed fact exists as to Heinz's claim and when it arose, the District Court properly 
applied the rules of statutory construction in this case. 
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A more logical reading of subsection of 803(a) is that the legislature intended that 
upon the opening of an estate and appointment of a personal representative, the time 
limits for "presentation" of a claim under 803 are triggered. The presumption under 
Idaho Code§ 15-3-108 is that the estates will be opened within three (3) years of death 
except for those estates which qualify for a joint probate under Idaho Code§ 15-3-111. 
Upon opening of a joint probate under LC. § 15-3-111, as occurred in this instance, 
"claims against the decedent's estates" which arose before the death of the decedent must 
be "presented" within three (3) years after the decedents' death. Subsection 803 speaks in 
terms of presenting claims within three (3) years of the "decedent's death". But, which 
decedent's death triggers that three (3) year time limit in a joint probate under section 
111? 
For these reasons, the District Court properly applied the rules of interpretation 
and did not "add words" to subsection 111. The District Court decision should be 
affirmed. 
In section C.2. of the Appellant's Brief, the Appellant argues that the District 
Court misapplied the rule of construction that "general statute should not be interpreted as 
encompassing an area already covered by one which is more specific". Marshall v. 
Department of Transportation, 137 Idaho 337, 341, 48 P.3d 666,670 (App., 2002). 
The District Court properly observed that subsection 111 is a more specific statute 
within the probate code that provides an exception to the general rule that probate must 
be filed within three (3) years of the decedent's death. 
Appellant argues that subsections 803 and 111 are irreconcilable and the Court 
should enforce that act which was passed later in time by the legislature. Appellant 
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argues that since subsection 111 was last amended in 1997, whereas subsection 803 was 
last admitted in 2004, that 803 should be read in isolation to overrule any provisions for a 
later filing under the earlier passed statute in subsection 111. Appellant's Brief, p.24. 
First, the two (2) statutory provisions are not irreconcilable as is demonstrated by 
the District Court's Opinion. 
The second rnle of interpretation advanced by the Appellant runs counter to long 
established Idaho case law. "When considering the interpretation of a particular 
provision ... the court should look in the surrounding provisions for proper context." 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. McCormick, 153 Idaho 468,476,283 P.3d 
785, 793 (2012). 
"Provisions should not be read in isolation but must be interpreted in the context 
of the entire [statute]." State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863,866,264 P.3d 970,973 (2011); 
citing Farber v. Idaho State Insurance Fund, 147 Idaho 307,310,208 P.3d 289,292 
(2009). 
The District Court's ruling reversing the Magistrate should be affirmed and was a 
proper application of the holding in Marshall v. Department of Transportation, that a 
more general statute should not overrule a more specific statute. The Appellant's 
arguments suggest that the Court is required to read each provision in isolation, and this is 
contrary to established case law. 
Lastly, the Appellant in section C.3 and C.4 revisits the arguments concerning 
enforcement of the statutory creditor claim resulting in an absurd or unreasonably harsh 
outcome. Without revisiting prior argument, it is unclear what Appellant's assertions are. 
Beginning at pages 25 through 31 of Appellant's Brief, Appellant seems to simply restate 
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the purposes ofldaho Code§ 15-3-111. ("A joint probate allows the estate of the second 
· spouse to die to be probated and to finalize transfer of real property held in the name of 
the first spouse to die." Appellant's Brief, p. 26). 
Appellant's position from the beginning, seems to have been that this joint 
probate was unnecessary on Appellant's theory that Robert acquired all right, title and 
interest to the community estate when Hedy died. 
Ms. Cusack: So this idea of filing in Robert's estate is 
really, it doesn't matter because there is no claim. 
Anything that he would have had ended three years after 
Hedy's death. I don't see how we can-under the 
community property statute. It does say that spouses can 
bind the community property, that at her death that ended. 
And then three years after her death there was no 
opportunity, again, for Mr. Alt to say that there was any 
more community property. Because it just became separate 
property of Robert. So by - by waiting he lost his 
opportunity to collect if there was one. 
Tr. 8-24-2015, pp. 9-10. 
The Magistrate Trial Court did not accept Appellant's legal theory, nor did the 
District Court on appeal. 
Court: I have - I am struggling with your assertion, and I 
don't really know that it's particularly germane to the issue 
I have to decide, but your assertion that essentially, and 
correct me if I am misunderstanding it, at the instant Hedy 
died there was no more community property, it all became 
Robert's separate property. I don't know that I-that that 
makes sense that the transfer would be uh- so automatic. 
It seems to me that there is a community estate that would 
move forward in time until it's terminated either by 
operation of a three year statute of limitation or by a 
probate decision. 
Tr. 8/24/2015, p. 18, 11. 8-14 
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The Appellant again argues in her Brief that the Heinz's Credi1Dr's Claim is 
barred against Hedy's against and, therefore, barred in its entirety, once three (3) years 
have lapsed following her death. She asserts that Heinz was required to file a probate of 
Hedy's estate in order to assert his Creditor's Claim even thought that claim was a claim 
against both Hedy and Robert or a community obligation. The Appellant further argues 
that the operation of subsection 803 extinguishes the debt as against Hedy's estate and 
by extension of the Appellant's logic, the community property of Robert and Hedy 
miraculously became the separate property of Robert three (3) years following Hedy's 
death or after August 11, 2011. 
By this theory, the Appellant argues that Heinz's Creditor's Claim against Hedy's 
estate is extinguished or time barred under subsection 803 and that because it was a 
community obligation, but the community property without benefit of any probate 
proceeding, became the separate property of Robert, Robert's estate is likewise free of 
any creditor's claim. 
This theory, while creative, is not supported by any fundamental principles in 
either the Idaho Probate Code or community property law. Furthennore, it was a theory 
rejected by both the Magistrate and the District Court in oral argument and in its 
decision. The Magistrate's decision expressly provides that the claim may proceed 
against Robert's estate. 
This begs the practical question that overrides this case: If the Magistrate's 
Decision is correct and Heinz's claim is barred three (3) years after Hedy's death, what 
practical effect does that have on creditors in community property estates? The assets 
are community assets of Robert and Hedy. If, as the Appellant argues, Hedy's interest in 
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the property passed to Robert three (3) years after her death and became Robert's 
separate property, it also passed subject to any debt owed by Hedy to Heinz.2 
This absurd result as advanced by the Appellant would mean that in every case in 
which the marital community has a debt or obligation, the surviving spouse can 
extinguish that obligation by simply waiting out the creditors until the survivor dies and 
a joint probate is filed. For example, if husband and wife have a community credit card 
or mortgage debt and the wife dies first, would the husband be permitted to extinguish 
the balance on that debt by making minimum payments until his death then allowing his 
executor to claim that the debt was extinguished because more than three (3) years have 
lapsed since the wife's death? 
This illustrates the absurdity of the Appellant's position throughout this 
proceeding. The District Court correctly recognized this absurd result and his decision 
should be upheld. 
The District Court's decision should be affirmed and the matter remanded. 
D. Jadwiga is not entitled to her costs and attorney's fees. 
Jadwiga asserts a right to attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 15-8-208 and Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54. 
First, the correct procedure for claiming attorney's fees and costs on appeal is 
I.AR. 41, not IRCP 54. "Bank also cites Rule 54(e)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. That rule does not provide any authority for awarding attorney fees." Capps v. 
FIA Card Services, N.A., 240 P.3d 583,590, 149 Idaho 737, 744 (Idaho,2010) 
2 For purposes of this discussion, Respondent assumes that Jadwiga wilt assert that 
Robert was not obligated on the debt. 
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Second, Jadwiga has not been a prevailing in this matter and should not, therefore, 
be entitled to any costs or attorney's fees. 
Third, Jadwiga asserts, under Idaho Code§ 15-8-208, that she is entitled to her 
attorney's fees. LC. § 15-8-208 provides that either the District Court or the Court on 
appeal may in its discretion order costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to be 
awarded to any party (a) from any party to the proceedings; (b) from the assets of the 
estate or trust involved in the proceeding; or from any non-probate asset that is the subject 
of the proceedings. 
In addition to Appellant not being the prevailing party, the statutory provisions 
cited are found in the Trust Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA). Idaho Code§ 15-8-
202 sets forth the procedure for commencing a judicial proceeding which might trigger 
the provisions ofldaho Code § 15-8-208 and the award of attorney's fees. Subsection 
202 requires a commencement of a "new action" or a "action incidental to an existing 
judicial proceeding relating to the same trust or estate of non-probate asset". 
This Court previously addressed that fees and costs may only be awarded under 
this statutory provision where the "TEDRA were properly invoked" by the pleading, an 
agreement, or a judicial action. Ouemadav. Arizmende., 288 P.3d 826,834, 153 Idaho 
609, 617 (2012) 
The record contains no indication that a Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act 
judicial proceeding was ever commenced under Idaho Code § 15-8-202 nor was TEDRA 
invoked in the pleadings. Therefore, the attorney's fees provision found in I.C. § 15-8-
208 are inapplicable. Further, Appellant is not the prevailing party and is, therefore, not 
entitled to attorney's fees and costs. 
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E. Respondent is entitled to his attorney's fees and costs. 
Mr. Alt as the Respondent has been the prevailing party in this matter and is 
entitled to fees and costs on appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 41 and Idaho Code §12-121. 
"It is well established that "[ a J party claiming attorney's fees must assert the 
specific statute, rule, or case authority for its claim." Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord 
Excavating & Paving, Inc., 117 P.3d 130, 134, 141 Idaho 716,720 (2005) 
"But attorney fees are not awardable as a matter ofright. They should only be 
awarded when the court believes "that the action was pursued, defended, or brought 
frivolously, umeasonably, or without foundation." Idaho Military Historical Society, Inc. 
v. Maslen, 329 P.3d 1072, 1080-81, 156 Idaho 624, 632-33 (2014) 
Appellant's position was pursued, defended or brought frivolously, unreasonably 
or without foundation and Mr. Alt seeks an award of fees and costs on appeal. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court is asked to affirm the District Court's 
decision in the Opinion on Appeal dated November 29, 2016. This Court is further asked 
to award the Respondent his attorney's fees and costs on appeal based upon Idaho Code § 
12-121 and pursuant to the authority ofldaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. 
d, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _/j'_ day of July, 2017. 
By.f,£.~~~~~=~=---
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON 
Attorney for Respondent 
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